

Able Archer

1958 -

1962 - 19824 - now!

12-29-16

Hidden Crisis - CC/SC/ understanding to

US CA (Crisis for them)

understanding of US, public, even USG!  
Kien!

A

(RAND Qing, first after my visit

Memor at RAND!

Moscow Hub!

R Berlin threat/ult.

Bray (US CA before - now! SH

comp/ Kienit/ Kienan (this)

(Sputnik/CCM 1957)

What started it, for CC?

see China; Series on China = 3YA

monsoon, Cuba  
"games"

1979 - Bg CA in Offshore

1980 (Foliar plans  
1980

Reason: New flights

SU invasion

1980 Central Doctum

Comments (START-I!)

Moscow

Olympics (where?)

I: N-Bank 1978

RFTF! (Feng Pandl  
Call)

Now  
doing!

1980 - P-II, CCM!

31 - Central Point; Kingwood

82 P-II multis

KAL-001?

8. R Olympics  
2014 - Kien



John  
12-29-15

False alarms!

1983 - Mike C-II - Now?

(X) - US build-up (+ SO!)

(X) - Pres. ~~Nature~~ (NOT DUT  
Senate; R leading;

(X) - SU/R fearful of war w. US: Now? (Camp?)  
/ Cohen-better?  
Senate leaders

Iran / Syria / Ukraine / Belarus

(X) - Worn game NATO does attack (flames, p. 2)  
Admission  
(Cuba; NATO now / R now) Able Archer

(X) - Island enclosure  
Cuba; Berlin; Kaliningrad Baltics  
New RU (see RAND)  
2016  
Carson

(X) - False alarms (ignored)

Accidents

Alerts

(Bogom; Schlossberg)

(X) - Fear of disap. P-II 1985 1983  
FS/D-L ABM in Russia

Haidar Gins [ G-II  
for SU: US Admiral + GOES don't  
know! = 2016 (Cohen) 1983  
SU/R response to US (CA) (Rogov) 2016



able Area

12-29-16

James, p.2 Home - what should never happen

- Demo shot "message"

Center

Lee Butler

- all-out race

- Punishment

12-2



1981-83

I in crisis

12-29-86

I didn't know SU reaction  
to P-II + CM

BOOK ON  
MY RESISTANCE

I thought the dangerous

I agree with

like N - bus

analysis analysis 1981-83

MX

SND TOOK ACTION

Event II (when?)

(as w/ RPT  
1978

FU/FS weapons

dangerous "in a crisis

though I misled out

during false alarm

actual US FS

(either)

(under SU analysis)

I didn't know <sup>FEAR</sup> process in SU

Billing, Muller

1983 (KAL 007)

like: I didn't know (LDA)

when was I in Reaction?

- Mergers/Exercises!

as if I were in line

(I'm writing there)

with CP/SU but for

- Book Hook '69!

by own reason!

p-10 fans

SDI + P-II - negotiation of MAD

cheap why? If not,

FS, Praction...

What did CPD (Center, Bg.

have in mind?

and answer to  
negotiation of IV  
(well!)

Will - "answer to SS-20" (NOT so.)

German "fans"?

DC!

Real? W/G?

(+B-70)

→ MX? P-II, CP



12-29-16

W/ US, SU fear of deep,  
gain delegation?  
→ LOW, Dan Nord, prompt

MSRV 1969-72...

Hypo: If didn't know of NW (Kremer with  
Rosen thought STILL, DENIAL  
FS > SS!

Archibald - RBN  
(signature of NW)

But man D-2 must be by  
FS on street wearing - before  
opposing members take off.

Retail does not require

+LOW/LUA  
don't require  
DC/Moscow.

|| done "cash attack" OR on torpedo  
wearing does nothing for you (no D-L:  
to later  
OK, begins inter  
more fight out (after 1963!)  
(out, D-L) (bombers; not rules)

Deep is a 60 - for retail.

But too late for D-L

Remember: both sides willing to delegate


(SU - from late '70s? PD-49?

So - for prompt D-L, and HUMINT (SI) Bz?

SI-40

Will US imagine being

HUMINT? on street wearing?



(actual conflict)

Are POKOVSKY WARNING?



SU fear of surprise attack

(Roosevelt - Pearl Harbor)

ADW + Roberts

11

DELUSION!

(not just - no SU ambition  
RAND especially  
debated)

SU correctly saw US imperialism

but wrongly feared US surprise  
attack

like ADW/RAND 1954-61

"How could they?"

(Could they imagine NRC doing this?)

Ask Carter? (!)

(Not just (1987-88) US shifting balance!

(which K tried, & bluff  
them, Carter!

NOT for SU FS!

(nor did we think so,  
in 1962)

though (JCC) DECAP  
from Cuba, SLBM's

Nike + COB not entering

| wrong on SU reason for "correlation of forces"  
| (though COB didn't (?) figure on effect of US moves  
| on SU FEAR!



12-29-16

? 46 Reagan - believe in Overconfidence -

Note from  
John Bush

(like me, Accident...)

cannot believe from "unintended war"  
(SU) false claim - deliberate  
provocation - is that, "unintended,"  
unintended, accidental...

i.e. is absence of reality  
that either side either / derive  
an unpredictable FS / etc

etc

or surprise / provocation

(etc. can be, surprise, technically  
deliberate, designed

Provocation on false,

or even - extracted "warning"  
even - confident

47 former: The danger of fear of attack

our Sagan,  
Blair, Wilson

right - on charges

of LOW, threats +  
willingness to die?

"Where the really afraid? Were  
their fears genuine? (Might they have

[SEE NOW 12-30-16 COHEN

control on this - to attack, rather than to  
survive?

NOW - BOYS IN RUSSIA, POLAND

= P-II (express)



Interference?

12-30-16

Or even by pretending to fear and  
to curtail bombing

to split off allies

to increase allied <sup>or public</sup> pressure on us

to "know them"

(BMO;

P-II

(Note = US public is not aware of R plan,  
as indicated by Cohn

Is USG? HRC? Plan of aerial conflict

Jump?

(Legion? UK? Baltics?)

Alfred Archer (only?!) states

that danger of imminent fear (TCS;

of surprise attack

possibly preemptive

on strat. warning is intact, but technically

disregard to Japanese  
surprise

my  
Crahe  
Analysis  
P.G.

AS IN WWI

NOT WWII (SU failure to fear

US failure to fear

to fear on Pearl Harbor

like Germans in  
WWI

— Japanese "strat. warning" —  
— then on plans



12-35-86

"BMD = P-II" (Brasch II, 1983)  
Galathea Marine defense (in Rostov, Poland 2017)  
not merely "giving more offensive  
ICBMs, to offset D-2/CF effects of  
BMD  
but degree of draw.

not <sup>SU</sup> behind the warning of draw.  
justification / compuls SU FS, function

(How

? Did SU/Andropov draw from that draw.  
would delay launch of SU ICBMs  
(or though it would not draw launch)

2) so more <sup>ICBMs</sup> would be destroyed  
(then if Moscow would function  
on basis of target warning - Pitrow!)

3) so less/no effective SU CF on US?

(Fear was not as obviously as will  
behold as if draw. would paralyze!  
(No Deal Hand)



12-30-16

Now: 2) Putin doesn't think of R FS  
(or US, immit)  
but, US/HRC war, → WWII  
or just, but

3) Putin takes unprecedented steps  
to avert HRC/BHO

— Syria, S/T bridge  
BMO / deep.

(to install DVT, subject to  
manipulation by money,

+ blackmail — rapin 13-yr-olds

water of which free DVT

from institutional madness,

to be some, sensible, realistic  
about collab. with Russia

(as with other fascist regimes, like himself)



12-30-66

The most dangerous belief (still)?

we act as if ...

D-L

making PS threads  
(of US theme) more  
credible

(Type II  
"situation"  
- straining  
Type I Set  
(Prologue)

is better / less catastrophic  
than straining personal  
(into LUA or LOW!)

- Starting first (before every launch,  
start. warning, before drop

! might this allow leadership  
to survive? Only chance?

(No!) (Even if it gets to  
shelters - before launch  
(of drop. weapons)  
this really requires  
start. warning,  
not textual - or drop.

(See Japanese Army generals -  
wanted to prolong war + US cas.  
until US agreed not to prosecute  
them (as well as Emperor!)

That makes my usual conflict  
or long, minimal oral conflict  
my degrees

C-II

1983

NOW

Pre-Drop!



12-30-16

Book: NOW (pre-Jump!)

1) a deterioration of relations / trust  
between the 2 nuc. superpowers

a) DM

2)

b) high alert (CF

3)

(not just, say, unstable out-  
breaks (Chernobyl?), for actual  
and unstable CF warfare

(about first, so as

1) to lower danger

early so "feasible" 2) to ~~avoid~~ be launched out  
before 1) over of all, add to threat of  
warheads (deter-)

2) warheads on

damage.

the way, deterred

(deterred)

(not just DM's)

warrior - DM's

a) not perceived as DM's

b) linked to be potentially

D-L - overtly even

c) if triggered early enough -  
sooner the better - before arrival  
of

"a unstable DM - depending on NOW! not just "O is a bug"



12-30-84

4) Danger / possibility of actual conflict.  
(we're now on "opposite" sides  
different)

of shooting over, as Syria  
(close - fire)

(US - anti-ISIS today?!)

and anti-Assad

R - pro-Assad

anti-anti-Assad

anti-ISIS

Ukraine

5) Total build-up, on both.  
inc. ICBMs (ATL on LOW!)

6) BMD (= P-II' or SU MRBMs - China!)

INF on both!

(Don't BMD violate INF Accord?)

R developing INF US BMD?

not quite ICBMs!

Kaliningrad - Iskander II?!

7) (Am 1)

HRC - Putin is little

1983 - Gorbachev - R is  
nuclear. NATO

expansionist (China; UK? Baltics?)

what <sup>did</sup> ~~does~~ P. plan from HRC? Poland?)

8) Both sides (?) PSYOPS, bigging (esp. R!)

9) US public (USG?) unaware of R plan of war - <sup>or US</sup> contribution



Could Putin have done more to shut T?

12-29-16

→ HACKING?

Can R/Putin be "serious" now about

CD/Exorc?!

Civil Defense

(X)

Hyp: Putin sincerely scared about

see 2011, 2012

"regime change" with HRC (BHO?!

"regional elections"

YES!

even: FS?!

what for SecDef?!

see Michael

Reagan

(DOB-O'Malley?)

What did HRC

not no-cons

own at, what P?

2)

(Note  
focus)

Paper not wrong? SU mil. drill

before by central int

USS MinDef Ukraine

(Onobasov?!

= SAC?!

AWW HK Exiles (news, 805)

The

false

alarm

1983 - Real fear (P.C.I) of a non-existent

intent to attack DID with come now, or COMUS

(though, FS weapons, as well as hostile  
rhetoric)

NATO Genie ~~TS~~ 2016?!



12-29-16

11 PM

Hyp: Break?

Probs (Range)

Threats

Machman HAK, N, (TCS)

Demo: (Berth:)

Unpredictable

I don't know

went out of  
the deal

(Goal: - HAK, Air Weapons  
outgoing)

Dallas, brinkmanship

Trump:

K - meniscus thing known

see Range Psypops

1981-82

from 26

Stat. Comm - "make invention"

<sup>one</sup>  
(the Batcher on: sleep  
FS/O.C.

(opposite unventing  
disruption  
cover

not 1983 - where was he?

27

Why the PSYOPS?

Precedence of KAL-007: → Return



12-29-4

11:40 PM

Make clear:

US has not even intended (Killing?)  
a surprise Wre attack

<sup>RANK</sup>  
(as ~~US~~ belong framed in 1954-56-61)

[not possible - for SU]

as Chudakov belong framed  
~ 1974-83 [87]

KGB framed

like Putin framed.

in GKWB!

1989-92!

He/Querry?

JFK: No (I think  
LB) 0

N? Yes

Did any pres. really intend

to go to FU, as threatened?

Would he have?

Don't know  
never US-SU\*

But there

the convinced,  
rejected

(original idea, ever?)  
NBSC? '61?

Crucial?

Surprise?

pres

weapons

plans

FU

etc

preparation

\* Center 1980?! Area!

Sagan  
Pach  
Blum  
Burr  
Switzer  
Jones

How much did SU/CC/NUN been effort

I'VE NEVER SEEN!

\* commit FU?



12-29-16

What are the real dangers

and how - brief

Abba, Rachel - SU reactions for frustration<sup>\*</sup>  
on street - warning [any explicit warning  
of this?]

Armed.  
← 1) for warnings to frustrate - gain  
(possibly) 2) ten warning  
3) expressions?

(MCH)

False report  
of NATO alerts

NO  
43 DANGER

08


The whole thing is an exercise of  
P.G. Pollard's dist - mistaken fears of attack  
→ about reactions → unfounded fears of in  
consequence  
opposite →

strengthening of fears → reactions (alerts)  
ALSO, SREAN on neighborhood alerts

Reverse P.G. Petrov - clashes fears Sept 27

Ros - no response to SU alert,  
Petrov

(like GRIT - Hor. moves tanks, warnings...  
no (?) SU alert - C-II



Shady

43

and consequence  
frustration?

"Is <sup>SU</sup> frustration possible? So it presumably that  
Soviet Council believe / imagine that US was  
about to attack (superior; in "frustration")?  
Why did! ambiguity (Ustinov? Chubukov?)



12-30-16

Issue is a crisis:

as

C-IF Could JFK and K

Note from

56

STOP a war process:

currently CONTROL

U-2<sup>n</sup>, SAM, B-59

stop it is time

1983 War leave

2016 [Did Putin stop HRC?

for some reason that had Andropov  
to prepare to prompt?  
(to ensure strat. warning!]

few of deep      of P-E  
                                 of BMD

"possible" Andropov & could believe in US FS  
(for good reason)

"possibly"  
optimal

b) cancel exercise of SU prompt  
(= US: both, near

"Institutional modernity"

(Pat indicates by phrase,  
the meaning